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Abstract
This paper examines the link between pollution and income. The
main purpose of this paper is to assess whether the introduction of
income inequality in a Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) analysis
can give new insights into the relationship between pollution and eco-
nomic growth. The EKC hypothesis proposes that there is an inverted
U-shape relation between environmental degradation and income per
capita. This paper questions this common result, in a simple model
where the income inequality evolution is exogenous and where the
planner could use only one instrument. For a set of parameters values
we ￿nd, for example, a two-hump curve. JEL Classi￿cation: D3,
H4, Q2.
1Cet article analyse la relation entre pollution et revenu. L￿ objectif
de cet article est de montrer comment la prise en compte de l￿ inØgalitØ
des revenus, dans une analyse de la courbe environnementale de Kuznets,
peut modi￿er la relation entre pollution et croisssance. L￿ hypothŁse de
la courbe environnementale de Kuznets revient ￿ supposer l￿ existence
d￿ une forme en U inversØ entre la dØgradation de l￿ environnement et
le revenu par tŒte. Cet article remet en cause ce rØsultat ￿ l￿ aide d￿ un
modŁle simple dans lequel l￿ inØgalitØ du revenu evolue de maniŁre ex-
ogŁne et oø le planni￿cateur ne peut utiliser qu￿ un seul instrument.
Pour certaines valeurs des paramŁtres du modŁle nous trouvons que la
relation entre la pollution et le revenu suit une courbe ￿ deux bosses
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21 Introduction
In the 1970￿ s the limits to growth argument was that pollution is an inex-
orable by-product of industrialization and that increasing material a› uence
will entail a decreasingly attractive world. Since the early nineties some
economists argue that this view could be excessively pessimist since it ne-
glects the possibility of changes in technology, education, economic and polit-
ical structure which might mitigate the environmental problems. As Becker-
man (1992 page 489), puts it, ￿There is clear evidence that although economic
growth leads to environmental degradation in the early stages of the process,
in the end the best -and probably only- way to attain a decent environment
in most countries is to become rich￿ .
Recent studies give empirical support to this view. The World Develop-
ment Report (1992) was one of the ￿rst studies to show that some indicators
of environmental degradation increase with income. Later, several empir-
ical studies focused on the phenomenon of increasing and then decreasing
levels of pollutant with respect to GDP. Several authors have found that
many forms of air and water pollution follow an inverted-U relationship with
respect to GDP per capita. Among them, Grossman and Krueger (1994),
Sha￿k and Bandyopadahyay (1992), Panayotou (1993) and Selden and Song
(1994), found that pollution levels increase as a country develops, but begin
to decrease as rising income pass beyond a threshold level.
This inverted-U relationship has been de￿ned as the Environmental Kuznets
3Curve (henceforth EKC) after Simon Kuznets, as it resembles the shape of
the relationship that the Nobel Prize economist ￿rst observed between in-
come inequality and economic growth. Panayotou (1993) noted the similarity
between the two patterns and then applied the name of Kuznets to environ-
mental studies.
Several theoretical explanations for the relationship between pollution
and economic growth have been proposed (Selden and Song (1995), Stokey
(1998) and Andreoni and Levinson (2001)). A tremendous body of literature
examines empirically the link between pollution and growth (see for example
the survey of Borghesi (1999)).
The inverted-U relationship re￿ ects the changing strength of three in-
￿ uences on the environment, the scale, the composition and the technique
e⁄ect. In the ￿rst place, growth exhibits a scale e⁄ect on the environment
because increases in economic activity generate more pollution. In the second
place, growth induces structural changes of the economy and so a compo-
sition e⁄ect, for example the large share of services in GDP in the post
industrial phase of development, could have a positive impact on the envi-
ronment. Moreover with economic growth technical progress could enhance
cleaner technologies, this is known as the technique e⁄ect.
Recent theoretical literature (see Vogel 1999) recognizes the importance
of the distribution of income through e¢ ciency and equity in the provision of
environmental quality but little attention has been paid to the link between
Environmental Kuznets Curve and the original Kuznets Curve (henceforth
4KC). Simon Kuznets (1955) postulates that income inequality increases and
then decreases during the process of development. This is precisely the start-
ing point of our study. Suppose that conditions are met to provide an EKC,
i.e. that when income exceeds a threshold, pollution starts to decrease. What
is the new pattern for pollution, if we consider not only changes in average
income but also changes in income inequality according to the Kuznets￿in-
verted U-shaped hypothesis?
Research into the causal e⁄ects of income inequality on environmental
policy is scarce and limited to empirical studies. Torras and Boyce (1998)
provide a reduced form speci￿cation of the EKC in which income inequality
is included as a regressor, and ￿nd ambiguous support for their hypothesis
that income inequality reduces environmental quality.
In order to highlight this possible ambiguous e⁄ect of income inequality,
we consider a simple environmental model where the income inequalities
follow a bell curve. In this case we show that EKC is not necessarily a bell
curve. It could be an ￿ environmental camel curve￿i.e. a curve with two
humps1. Our result is based on a public good model of the provision of
environmental quality. In our model, a linear consumption tax is used to
curtail consumption (which generates pollution) and the tax revenue is used
to ￿nance abatement activities. Such a policy, obviously, is more appropriate
for a high income country. We have this case in mind, and our result is
consistent with the estimations of Taskin and Zaim (2000) for a sample of
rich countries (OECD).
52 A public good model of the provision of
environmental quality
2.1 The Model
We take environmental quality to be a pure Samuelsonian public good; this is
a world in which all individuals consume exactly the same quality of air, water
and other environmental goods, or su⁄er of the same quantity of pollution.
The economy is populated by a large number of individuals. Population
size is normalized to one. All individuals have identical preferences over a
consumption good c bought at a price equals to one. Consider a consumer￿ s
utility function U(c;P) = c￿ ￿ P where P represents aggregate emissions.
This utility function is increasing in c, the individual consumption level,
and decreasing in P. The consumer is endowed with exogenous income m.
We introduce income inequalities in this economy. According to Kuznets
(1955) these inequalities follow a bell curve when average income increases.
So we assume that the relationship between the average income and the
inequality index is given. Doing that we want to show what is the new
pattern for pollution. The cumulative density function of individual incomes
is denoted by F. The support of income distribution is the non-negative
real line and I￿(m), represents the Atkinson Kolm and Sen (AKS) inequality
index2. Pollution P is assumed to be proportional to the total consumption
and we note by a the emission coe¢ cient by unit of consumption. In order to
6￿nance abatement costs, we assume that government collects a consumption
tax3 at the uniform rate t.
We use speci￿c functional forms from the start because few analytical









We assume that ￿ and ￿ belong to [0;1], and a > 0, b > 0. The con-
sumption good is always provided privately, while pollution is a public good.
Individuals do not earn the same income.
Since utility is increasing in consumption and the consumer does not
contribute voluntarily to the reduction of pollution, c is equal to m
1+t.


















































￿+1 = 0: (1)








￿ 1 + 2t ￿ ￿
t2￿￿ (1 + t)
￿+2 ￿ 0 (2)
2.2 The case ￿ = 1
We now study the case ￿ = 1. Using the ￿rst order condition (1) and
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and M(I￿) = a+b
b M(I￿).
8We note that optimal solutions, for consumption and pollution, may be-
long to three di⁄erent regimes depending on the average income level. In the
￿rst regime all income is devoted to consumption and as no e⁄ort is done for
abatement, pollution increases. The second phase is an ￿environment phase￿
in the sense that the optimal abatement e⁄ort is strictly positive. The last
phase is due to the non negativity constraint on pollution. The ￿gure below
illustrates our results. M(I￿) and M(I￿) are the lower respectively the upper
bound for average income delimiting the environment phase.
Firstly note that both income thresholds are decreasing functions of the
inequality index. This means that a society crosses the line between the de-
velopment phase and the environment phase at a lower average income when
inequality is large. This is due to the redistribution impact of environmental
policies which are more stringent in highly unequal societies.
Secondly, we draw on the same ￿gure the income inequality relationship
according to the Kuznets￿hypothesis. Straightforward computation shows
that in the environment phase dP
dE(m) < 0 if dI￿
dE(m) > 0 and dP
dE(m) Q 0 if
dI￿
dE(m) < 0. This implies that it is not possible to determine the sign of the
variation for pollution, when average income increases and income inequality
decreases. For particular values of the parameters it is then possible to
have an increasing part for the pollution curve in this phase. In order to
obtain a two humps curve for pollution it is necessary (not su¢ cient) that
the maximum inequality occurs before or during this phase.
92.3 The case ￿ < 1
In this case the model is more interesting because the consumption path is
strictly increasing as the average income increase. So there is a direct income
e⁄ect on the consumption. Unfortunately, when ￿ < 1 it is not possible to
￿nd explicit formula for each endogenous variable. But our purpose is only
to prove that applied economists have to take into account the inequality
evolution in order to get a better EKC estimation, so it is su¢ cient to ￿nd
a numerical counter example. In fact we got lots of counter examples (see
appendix). Consider, for example, the following set of parameter values:
￿ = 0:2, ￿ = 0:9, a = 0:01 and b = 0:005. The optimal value of t is
10obtained by solving5 numerically equation (1). Income follows a Lognormal
distribution namely ￿(￿;￿2). We pick a grid of 100 pairs (￿;￿), where ￿
increases over [1;3:5] and ￿ increases over [0:7;1:6] and after decreases to go
back 0:7. The optimal values of consumption and pollution are represented
below as function of average income E(m). Consumption is always increasing
in this case. The next ￿gure representing both pollution and consumption
as a function of average income, shows an unusual EKC, with two modes.
When the inequality index in a society follows a Kuznets curve as in our
case, there is a unique average income level at which inequality is greatest. A
linear consumption tax used to ￿nance pollution abatement will reduce the
level of inequality. As a result it is then possible to have a local minimum
of pollution at the index inequality maximum. It is interesting to note that
original Kuznets income inequality evolution may invalidate the environmen-
tal income relationship in the recent theoretical models on EKC. In addition,
our result is consistent with the curve estimated by Taskin and Zaim (2000).
These authors use nonparametric methods in order to get more general esti-
mations than the quadratic and the cubic ones, used in most applied studies.
The intuition behind our results is as follows. At low income levels en-
vironmental degradation and inequality tend to rise since people are willing
to accept increasing environmental degradation and inequality in exchange
for higher consumption. However, as individuals achieve higher living stan-
dards, they care more for the quality of the environment and the distributive
fairness of the societies they live in. Therefore, in this view, at su¢ ciently
11high income levels the government is induced to introduce egalitarian and
environmental policies under the pressure of public opinion (e.g. egalitarian
movements like trade unions or ecological movements such as green parties
or NGOs). This intervention tends to reduce inequality and pollution in the
country, thus pushing the economy towards the decreasing portion of the KC
and the EKC.
The search for explanations of the EKC is severely hampered by the use
of reduced-form model. The EKC only describes the statistical relationship
between income and certain types of pollutant as an inverted-U curve. Some
12studies have added variables other than income to the regressions, gini index
for example, to capture the impact of income inequality. As shown in this
paper, the relative impact of income inequality on the environment is am-
biguous. As a consequence, empirical tests of the hypothesis that inequality
a⁄ects the environment may not be based on a simple polynomial function
of income inequality index (see Borghesi (2000)).
3 Conclusion
To conclude our article we want to stress again two points. One of them
is that EKC could be non consistent with Kuznets￿works. Therefore the
label EKC does not make sense. At ￿rst glance, this point seems irrelevant
and just an anecdote. But let￿ s think about the tremendous body of applied
literature which has taken as given this ￿Kuznets shape￿ for the income-
pollution relationship. These works have been interpreted by some decision
makers as a justi￿cation of laissez faire: ￿growth will do the job￿ . As the
average income of the society under consideration is on the increasing phase,
the pollution will decrease inde￿nitely. With our result this point is not true,
the pollution could increase after the ￿rst decreasing phase. So if the society
wants to decrease right now and inde￿nitely the pollution, it must de￿ne
complex regulation tools, at least more complex than the tax in this article.
The other point is, even if our model is simple it gives an explanation
for environmental policies evolution in the richest countries over the last
13twenty years. During this period in these countries investment on pollution
abatement technologies have increased as the inequalities (i.e. there is a
negative impact of inequality on pollution). Our aim is not to say they are
wrong but to ￿nd the relation between inequality and pollution when the
need of redistribution is the most important. One way, for a planner, in an
unequal society (but a developed one) to make redistribution is to reduce
pollution in order to increase welfare. Our theoretical result is reinforced by
the empirical paper of Torras and Boyce (1998). They found, for the case of
sulfur dioxide and smoke, that greater income inequality is associated with
less pollution in high-income countries.
4 Appendix
In the simulation presented in section 2.3, for the set of parameters values
￿ = 2, ￿ = 0:9, a = 0:01 and b = 0:05, the chosen parameters relative to
the log normal distribution leads to a KC such that we exhibit a case where
the pollution income relationship is a two-hump curve. Note that, as the
optimal tax and then pollution and consumption are functions of income and
income inequality, it is possible to simulate our model without any particular
assumption relative to the income distribution probability.
A simulation of our model based on a grid value for average income6
over [0;50] and income inequality over [0;1] intervals, gives us (after solving
numerically the optimal tax level associated for each pair values: income
14and income inequality) the pollution and consumption levels as a function of
income and income inequality (see the following ￿gures).
From these two ￿gures, it is possible to ￿nd cases where pollution income
relationship could be a two-hump curve. The following diagram represents
15the shape of the isopollution (Iso P) and isoconsumption (Iso C) curve as a
function of income and income inequality, over the environment phase.
As depicted in the following diagram, if the KC (the dotted line) is "more"
concave than the isopollution curve, then necessarily pollution could decrease
while we are in the environment phase. Note ￿nally that consumption is still
increasing.
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19Notes
1The theoretical works of Magnani (2000), Marsiliani and Renstr￿m (2000) do take
into account the evolution of inequality, but they do not obtain our result that the time
path of pollution can have two local maxima.
2The pattern of global inequality as measured by AKS indices is remarkably similar to
the Gini index which is the most widely used index. (see Sala-i-Martin (2002)). In our





E(m) (see Blackorby, Bossert
and Donaldson (1999)).
3We consider the case in which the government uses the whole tax revenues in order to
reduce pollution. Introducing, for example, lump sum transfers is one way to generalize
our model.
4With the exception of Andreoni and Levinson (2001), more general models, like Mc-
Connell (1997), give us poor results about the restriction on either the utility function or
the abatement technology that are necessary to generate an EKC. However, our topic is
not to ￿nd general su¢ cient conditions for an inverted-U-sphape pollution-income rela-
tionship.
5We use the library NLSYS in a GAUSS program which is available upon request.
6The values for income chosen are such that we describe completely the development
and environment phase whatever the value is for income inequality in [0;1].
20